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Abstract
We examine a model where households develop external habits by following norms
and therefore have multiple habits in both consumption and labour supply. In doing
so, they contribute to habit formation and hence pose an externality eﬀect on others.
Our ﬁndings are: ﬁrst, that consumption and work habit (‘work ethic’) drive us to-
wards a 24/7 society; both forms of habit increase the labour supply of households.
Second, the two externalities involved in external habit work in opposite directions.
For consumption, external habit is a negative externality as it reduces the utility of
others in the economy. By contrast work ethic reduces the disutility and is there-
fore a positive externality. Third, as a result of our second ﬁnding, multiple habits
can involve both a consumption tax and subsidy to correct for these externalities.
Fourth, with plausible parameter values, the welfare consequences of multiple habits
are far greater where there are long-run ineﬃciencies compared with only transitional
ineﬃciency.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D12, E52.
Keywords: Catching-up with the Joneses, Work Ethic, Savings, Output Ineﬃciency
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
“Habit is second nature, or rather, ten times nature,” William James (1957)
In this paper we address the eﬀects of multiple external habits and the ensuing lifestyles
which have received separate treatment in the literature but have not been examined to-
gether. By multiple external habits we mean habits in labour-eﬀort and consumption.
Thus, in the case of consumption the household derives utility on the basis of comparing
their consumption to an exogenously given benchmark; commonly known in the literature
as ‘catching-up with the Joneses’. In the case of labour supply the household derives disu-
tility by comparing his work eﬀort relative to an exogenously given benchmark; possible
reasons for such work-ethic will be discussed shortly. By lifestyle we mean the equilibrium
values and the inter-temporal paths of consumption and labour-eﬀort. While habits are of-
ten regarded as having a negative impact only during inter-temporal stages of an economic
outcome, we suggest that this may not be the case: in particular we investigate the extent
to which both the dynamics, as well as the long-run steady-state equilibrium values of an
outcome, are driven by the strength of these two habits. To complete our investigation,
we also discuss the welfare implications and policy implications of our results.
Consumption habits and the related ineﬃciencies are relatively well researched in
the literature. In a series of important papers Alonso-Carrera, Caballé and Raurich
(2004/5/6) show in models of capital accumulation with the AK technology1 that con-
vergence path towards the steady-state is ineﬃcient relative to the preferred path of the
social planner when consumption habits are external. Carroll, Overland and Weil (1997,
2000) consider the transitional dynamics of an endogenous growth model with AK technol-
ogy and show that with consumption habits the economy sluggishly moves to the balanced
growth path. Alvarez-Cuadrado, Monteiro and Turnovsky (2004) show that with external
or internal habits the time paths of variables such as per capita savings, consumption and
capital substantially diﬀer from the case when preferences are fully exogenous. However,
labour supply is inelastic in these papers; a shortcoming partially addressed elsewhere
in the literature. Indeed, in a model of consumption-habits only, Seckin (2001) show
that the consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ is weaker and thus agent’s lifestyle is one of high
consumption and low leisure. In an endogenous growth model with elastic labour-supply
and no habits Turnovsky (2000) highlight the role of ﬁscal policy and its adverse aﬀects
for the balanced growth path. These results are of special relevance to us as they may
be reversed or strengthened depending on the relative strength of the two habits; as we
1Alonso-Carrera (2004) is an exception. Here they employ what is known as the Sobelow production
function: f(k)=Ak + Bk
β; a combination of the Cobb-Douglas and the AK functions.
2discuss later.
Compared with consumption habit, the interest in the idea of work ethic in the sense
that household supply labour by comparing to an externally given benchmark is sparse.
Indeed, why should the household compare their work level with the Joneses when they
dislike working at ﬁrst place. To answer this question, it is best to separate it into
two sub questions: a) why work more and b) why compare those levels to that of the
Joneses. Tentative answers to these question may be provided by the research based on
Max Weber’s ideas of protestant work ethic (PWE), on the one hand, and information
theory and behavioral economics on the other. Many authors believe PWE sowed the
seeds for the contemporary work culture where a strong desire for money may be a sign for
success. In the Victorian era such a desire would translate into God’s grace. Although, it
is not possible to summarize the vast literature on PWE, the following few lines from Oates
(1971) capture its essence: ‘A universal taboo is placed on idleness, and industriousness
is considered a religious ideal; waste is a vice, and frugality a virtue; complacency and
failure are outlawed, and ambition and success are taken as sure signs of God’s favour; the
universal sign of sin is poverty, and the crowning sign of God’s favour is wealth.’ Therefore,
a PWE society is not only hard-working, but also one where there are incentives to exert
as much eﬀort as everyone else; answering the two questions. Nonetheless, the extent to
which PWE is a sound justiﬁcation for catching-up with Jonses in labour supply in the
21st century is open to criticism. Consequently, we turn to our second set of explanations.
The information economics literature such as Holmstrom (1992) develop a model of
career-concern (reputation) where there is uncertainty about the ability of workers. In
this framework workers will choose to provide high eﬀo r ts oa st op o s i t i v e l ya ﬀect the
beliefs on their ability. In a multi-agent model where workers compete with one another
for a prize, such as promotions, one can envisage a situation where the reputation concern
induces agents to work at least as hard as their peers. Such an argument is well-known
in the tournament theory (See Prendergast (1999) for a review of this literature). In
these models, the desire to outperform players (workers) in the tournament, assuming
homogenous ability, induces players to work-hard as much as one another. Finally, Kandel
and Lazear (1992) argue that in the presence of peer pressure where deviating from a norm
delivers disutility to the agent, workers will supply at least as much eﬀort as anyone else
in the group. All these arguments give some justiﬁcation for conducting research in
comparison utility in labour supply; a key aim of this paper.
At this stage it is useful to brieﬂy consider the existing literature on consumption
and work habits. At an empirical level, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
empirical role for social interaction and habit formation in explaining female labour supply.
3At a theoretical level, Ljungvist and Uhlig (2000) consider a model of consumption habits
with labour supply, but no work ethic, and analyze the role of taxes. They highlight
the importance of ﬁne-tuning the economy intertemporally through an income-tax and
also show that the optimal tax policy is procyclical. Our results are generally supportive
of this view. Where we diﬀe ra r et h el e v e lo ft a x e sa n ds i z eo fi n e ﬃciencies. Indeed,
in a multiple habit setup people are taxed less than single habit model the reason being
that one habit tends to negate the eﬀects of the other. Lettau and Uhlig (2000) consider
a model of consumption and leisure habits in the context of analyzing business cycle
stylized facts; thus ignoring taxation and welfare issues. They generally are not supportive
of work habits. For example, with leisure habits they argue that labour input is too
smooth. However, recent empirical work, such as Gali (2005), show some constancy in
working hours. They ﬁnd that the average growth in weekly hours of workers in 21 US
manufacturing industries during the period of 1958-19962 is close to zero; this despite the
technological advances that have taken in the last two decades. Why are workers, new
and experienced, pegged to similar working hours? Is it due to regulation? Or, is it work
ethic? Vendirk (1993) consider how labour market experience feeds back into preferences
through multiple habits. This feedback mechanism is particularly relevant for explaining
unemployment hysteresis where transitory shocks lead to permanent changes. Kubin and
Prinz (2002) consider a model with only work habits and show the positive link between
work habits and current labour supply. In their model current labour-supply is more wage
elastic in the long-run relative to the short-run. Faria and Léon-Ledesma (2004) consider
the steady-state properties of a neoclassical growth model with only work-habits. They
show that agents tend to overwork compared with the neoclassical labour supply and the
level of the steady-state labour-supply depends on the type of technology.
We consider a dynamic model where an agent accumulates a stock of capital together
with consumption and work habits. The agent takes as exogenous consumption and work
benchmarks on the basis of which habits are formed. In line with empirical literature and
the idea that habits are an evolutionary process, the agent gradually adjusts to habits.
The agent has a Cobb-Douglas production technology, a far less restrictive framework than
the AK function (See Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) on this point). In the presence of
these habits, welfare costs arise because the agent overlooks the externality of conforming
and contributing to the process of habit-formation by choosing a suboptimal lifestyle given
2NBER Industrial Dataset: Annual Average Growth in Weekly Working Hours: Food: 0.000754, To-
bacco: 0.0011, Textile: 0.001827, Apparel: 0.001204, Lumber: 0.001763, Furniture: 0.001132, Paper:
0.000907, Printing 0.000975, Chemical: 0.001555, Petrol: 0.00464, Rubber: 0.001219, Leather: 0.001477,
Stone: 0.001225, Print: 0.003457, Fabric: 0.001619, Machine: 0.001939, Electric: 0.000787, Motor:
0.002056, Transport: -0.00017, Instrument: 0.000316, Miscellaneous: 0.001121.
4the level of overconsumption and overwork. As discussed below, this method of modelling
habits is diﬀerent from what is available from other literature in this area.
We extend the literature in three ways: (i) situations where an agents accumulates
simultaneous habits have received relatively little attention but, as we have argued, are
clearly appropriate; (ii) we examine the problem in the context of a capital accumulation
model with endogenous labour supply, compare the results with that of the social planner
and examine its dynamic features; (iii) using empirical estimates from the literature, we
provide numerical results on the nature of the ineﬃciencies that arise in a multiple habit
and the optimal path of taxes that brings the economy in line with that chosen by the
social planner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we set up the household’s
optimization problem. In Section 2 we discuss the nature of steady-states for both the
centralized and the decentralized economies. We devote Section 3 to a discussion on the
implications for the ﬁscal policy. In Section 4 we compare the dynamic characteristics of
both economies in the vicinity of the steady state. Section 5 provides simulation results
for these characteristics and a ﬁnal Section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an inﬁnite horizon economy in continuous time that consists of inﬁnitely-lived
identical households. The household is assumed to have additively separable preferences
over consumption c(t) and labour-eﬀort l(t). The individuals take into consideration
certain benchmark given externally when making decisions. Thus, they derive utility
from consumption relative to a benchmark level z(t). Hence, they are catching-up with
the Joneses type agents. In line with the discussion in the Section (1), the individuals
derive disutility by providing labour relative to a benchmark level n(t). This benchmark
level can be the result of PWE or peer-pressure so individuals do not feel bad so long as









with σ,φ > 0 and γ,ε ∈ [0,1), (1)
The power utility is standard and consistent with the requirements of RBC literature see
Caroll et al. (2000), King et al. (1988), Campbell (1994) and Alvarez-Cuadrado (2004).
The terms γ and ε capture the weight assigned to the consumption benchmarks and work
ethic where unity implies the strongest form of conformity and zero implies a society is
3We exclude the possibility of pusnishment when the agent works over the benchmark.
5free from benchmarking. When γ =0 ,σ>1 is the relative risk aversion parameter (
or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution). The constant χ>0 is a
preference parameter and φ>0 is the elasticity of labour supply. In the steady state
equilibrium of identical households, c = z and n = l and U(c,l)=c(1−γ)(1−σ)
1−σ −χl(1− )(1+φ)
1+φ .
We impose concavity in c and semi-convexity in l which requires
σ(1 − γ)+γ>0; φ(1 −  ) −   ≥ 0. (2)
The production function is a standard Hicks-neutral Cobb-Douglas given by
y(t)=f(k(t),l(t)) = Ak(t)al(t)1−a, 0 <a<1 and A>0. (3)
where A represent the technology shocks. This production function has important merits.
First, it conveniently allows for labour in the neoclassical model. Second, it is less
restrictive in that it allows for time paths consistent with stylized facts something the AK
technology lacks.
When household’s output net of depreciation and consumption is positive there is
capital stock accumulation so that
˙ k(t)=f(k(t),l(t)) − δk(t) − c(t), (4)
where δ>0 is the rate at which capital depreciates. The economy is assumed to be
closed.
The benchmarks or habits are subject to an evolutionary process and change over time
according to:
˙ z(t)=ρ(c(t) − z(t)), (5)
and
˙ n(t)=α(l(t) − n(t)). (6)
The Eq. (5) shows that the intertemporal change in the stock of consumption norms or
habits depend on individual’s current consumption relative to a benchmark. Likewise, Eq.
(6) captures the evolution of work ethic and it depends on current work pattern relative
to the levels inherent in society. Thus, whenever the current values for consumption or
labour eﬀort outweigh existing accepted norms the habit benchmarks evolves to a higher
levels. The parameters ρ and α represent the relative importance of consumption and
labour eﬀo r ta tv a r i o u sp o i n ti nt i m e . F o re x a m p l e ,a sρ →∞consumption habits are
instantaneously absorbed in current consumption without any friction. However, it is
reasonable to assume for all habits that ρ,α ∈ (0,1);a na s s u m p t i o na l s of o u n di nF u h r e r
(2000), Carroll et al. (2000), Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) for consumption
habits. Therefore, agents only gradually adjust to new benchmarks.
63 The Optimization Problem
3.1 The Decentralized Economy





by choosing a time path for consumption c(t) and labour supply l(t).T h e p r e s e n t i s
normalized so that t =0 . Therefore, lifetime utility is given by, U(0) and θ is the pure
rate of the time preferences. The consumer faces a lifetime constraint (4). In this version
o ft h em o d e lt h eh o u s e h o l dt a k e sh a b i ts t o c k s ,z(t) and n(t), as exogenous in her optimal
choices of consumption and labour eﬀort. It is convenient to adopt a ‘Yeoman-Farmer’
model as the separation of household and ﬁrms is not central to our analysis4.
Using the Maximum Principle the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions, dropping t for ease
of exposition, are
Uc = ψ, (8a)
Ul = −ψfl, (8b)
˙ ψ =( θ + δ)ψ − ψfk. (8c)
where ψ is the shadow price of capital, i.e. the co-state variable associated with the
constraint (4). At the equilibrium (8a) says that the utility from an additional unit of
consumption adjusted for its aﬀects on future habits equals the shadow value of capital
ψ−the value of sacriﬁcing a unit of households’ assets in the future. Using (8a), the
condition (8b) show that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labour is given by the marginal productivity of labour; giving the neoclassical labour
supply curve. In both these conditions the household ignores the eﬀect of his actions on
the evolutionary process of habits. Equation (8c) is the standard inter-temporal allocation
condition that equates the rates of returns on consumption and capital. Setting, ˙ ψ =0the
equation gives the well-known modiﬁed-golden-rule which ensures maximum consumption
when the net marginal productivity of capital equals the rate of time preference. The
transversality condition is limt→∞[e−θtψ(t)k(t) ]=0and says that the value of capital—
the quantity k(t) time its shadow price—approaches zero to time goes to inﬁnity. The
intuition is that if we think of t = ∞ as some ﬁnal point in household’s planning, then at
this point in time he does not want to leave behind any unconsumed asset. Finally, the
initial condition k(0) is exogenously given.
4It is straightforward to show the standard result that separating households and ﬁrms lead to the same
equilibrium.
7The steady-state values for labour eﬀort, consumption and capital stock in the decen-
tralized economy (DE) are obtained by substituting out the derivatives of the utility and







































The economy is entirely driven by labour-eﬀort which in turn strongly responds to deeply
rooted habitual patterns. For example, it is straight forward to check from (9a) that given
(2), households unambiguously supply more labour when the work ethic, ε, increases; a
result also present in Kubin and Prinz (2002). Similarly, the household labour supply
is unambiguously positively related to the consumption habit parameter γ provided that
σ>1. The equilibrium consumption in (9b) depends on the labour-supply which in turn
depends on the habits. Finally, from (9c), the accumulation of capital also increases with
habit. Thus to summarize we have:
Proposition 1
Provided the concavity and convexity condition holds and σ>1, individuals
in the economy consume, work and produce more as both consumption and
work habits assume greater importance.
Habit in short produces high consumption, output and labour supply; a lifestyle un-
ambiguously ineﬃcient in the eyes of the social planner as we discuss next.
3.2 The Social Optimum or Internal Habit
The analysis thus far was restricted to a decentralized economy with competitive house-
h o l d s . W ec a nu s et h es a m es e t u po ft h em o d e la n dp r e t e n dt h a tt h ee c o n o m yi sr u nb ya
benevolent social planner who maximizes the household’s the lifetime expected utility (7)
by internalizing the presence of the two habits. Hence, alongside (4) the planner is also
constrained by (5) and (6). There are now three state variables n(t),z(t) and k(t) which
are aﬀected by households decisions. The current value Hamiltonian, dropping t,i s
8H = U(c,z,n,l)+λρ(c − z)+βα(l − n)+ψ[f(k,l) − c − δk], (10)
where ψ, λ and β are the shadow values of capital, consumption and working habits
respectively. The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions are
Uc + λρ − ψ =0 , (11a)
Ul + βα+ ψfl =0 , (11b)
˙ λ = −
∂H
∂z
+ θλ = −Uz +( ρ + θ)λ, (11c)
˙ β = −
∂H
∂n
+ θβ = −Un +( α + θ)β, (11d)
˙ ψ = −
∂H
∂k
+ θψ = −ψ(fk − δ)+θψ. (11e)
Laws of motions (5), (6) and (4), and ﬁrst-order conditions (11a) to (11e) gives us eight
equations for sequences c(t), z(t), n(t), l(t), k(t), λ(t), β(t) and ψ(t). The initial condi-











The conditions (11a) and (11b) are the ﬁrst-order condition adjusted for evolutionary
nature of habits. The left-hand-side of (11a) says that a rise in consumption has two
eﬀects: it raises marginal utility and makes the household catch-up with the benchmark.
The consumption norms have a shadow-value λ w h i c hi st h e nd i s c o u n t e db yt h es t r e n g t ho f
its habit evolution, ρ. At the equilibrium these increments must be matched by an equal
decrease in the accumulation of future capital stock, evaluated at ψ. By substituting (12a)
in (12b) we get the labour supply of the neoclassical model with the diﬀerence that optimal
wage (marginal-product of labour) must now balance the trade-oﬀs of relative marginal
utilities and the relative importance of consumption and work habits through time. The
tranversality conditions for capital stock is the same as is the DE. The intuition for the
conditions (12b) and (12c) is that it only makes sense to conform and reform to habits
before the household reaches the end of his planning horizon, i.e. when time is strictly
ﬁnite, after this point the value of habits reaches zero.
By substituting out for various derivatives of the utility and production functions in
the ﬁrst-order conditions and evaluating at the steady-state after some manipulation we














































The intuition of the factors that aﬀect labour supply are same as in the decentralized
economy. However, there is one extra term, the second term in the square brackets in
(13a), which is the ratio of the parameters representing work to consumption habits. As
is the in the case of DE, the consumption levels and capital stock depend on the labour
supplied.
Proposition 2
In the steady state, the level of labour-eﬀort in the decentralized economy,













Taking propositions 1 and 2 together we can see that consumption and work habit
h a v et h es a m ee ﬀect on labour supply, consumption and output. External habits ( or
Keeping-up with the Jones) means that people consume more at the expense of leisure.
The work ethic eﬀect of habit in labour supply mean that households work more adding
to the consumption habit eﬀect. Both forms of habit drive us towards the 24/7 society.
However, the two externalities involved in external habit work in opposite directions.F o r
consumption external habit is a negative externality as it reduces the utility of others
in the economy. By contrast external habit in labour supply reduces the disutility and
therefore is a positive externality. Hence the ineﬃciencies move in opposite directions and
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Figure 1: Relative Labour Supply
In case where there is no presence for both consumption and labour eﬀort habits,
γ = ε =0the both sides of (14) is unity and the decentralized economy is eﬃcient. For
the social optimum or an economy where habits formation is internalized, i.e., (11a)-(11e),
the level of labour eﬀort supplied is determined as follows. On the one hand, it depends
on the importance of consumption relative to the benchmark, γ, and the relative weight
of consumption at diﬀerent times, ρ. On the other hand, it depends on the importance
of work ethic, ε, and the relative weight of work-eﬀo r ta td i ﬀerent times α.I n a s t e a d y -
state where consumption habits dominate working habits (i.e.,
ργ
ρ+θ > αε
α+θ)t h es u p p l y
of labour is always greater than the one chosen by the social planner. Similarly, the
consumption and capital stock are greater than those chosen by the social planner when
social consumption habit dominate work habits 5. To illustrate this point, consider Figure
1 where we plot labour supply of the decentralized economy relative to the centralized
economy by dividing Eq. (13a) and (9a). We use the parameters values collected from
the literature in Table 1 below.
For the solid line in Figure 1 we set ρ,ε,γ =0 .5, θ =0 .05 and vary the speed of adjust-
ment to labour-benchmark α between zero and unity. When there are no accumulation of
5A similar result was obtained in Choudhary and Levine (2006) where ρ, α →∞and they get (1−γ) >
(1 −  ) but in a New Keynesian model output and labour market imperfections, but without capital.
11work habits, as is commonly done in the growth literature, the amount of labour supplied
is always greater than the social optimum. However, as work habits accumulate, the level
of decentralized labour supplied gradually falls in line with that of the social optimum.
Now, consider the broken-squared-line where we set α, ε,γ =0 .5, θ =0 .05 and instead
vary between zero and unity the speed of adjustment consumption benchmark ρ.A s l o n g
as the adjustment in consumption habit dominate the work habit parameter (ρ>α ),t h e
decentralized labour supply exceeds the social optimum i.e., the shaded areas. However,
the empirical estimates of γ, ρ and ε, α are mixed and this has non-trivial implications
for studies such as Fuhrer (2000), Carroll et, al. (2000), Abel (1990) and Constantinides
(1990), Faria and León-Ledesma (2004), Alvarez-Cuadrado et, al. (2004). For most
studies is the grey area in Fig. 1.
Table 1. The Range of Parameters from the Literature
Parameters
Papers ργ σ ε ϕ χ α A aδθ
Alanso-Carrera, et al. (2005) US 0.5 5 0.18 0.35 0.09 0.03
Alanso-Carrera et. al. (2004) US 0.35 0.15 2 1 0.06 0.03
Carroll et al. (2000) US 0.2 0.25-0.75 11/3-9 0.09 0.03
Carroll et al. (1997) US 0.2 0.5 2 0.05 0.05
Alvarez-Caudrado et al (2004) US 0.2 0.5 2.5 1 0.35 0.05 0.04
Choudhary and Levine (2006) US 0.8 0.5 0.01
IMF (2003) (Bayoumi et al.) WORLD 0.5-0.97 5.0   = γ 3-
Euro-Model (2003) (Smets et al.) Euro Zone 1.4 2.4 -
Basu and Kimball (2000) US 0.35 -
Ham and Reilly (2003) UK 0.5-1.5 -
Baseline 0.2 0.5 2 0.5 0.2 1 2.0 1 0.35 0.05 0.03
4 The Decentralized Economy with Taxes
In order to study the role of taxation in correcting for ineﬃciencies in the households opti-
mization problem, we now add a consumption tax τ(t) to the model which is redistributed
as a ﬂat-rate transfer S(t) back to households.6 The capital stock accumulation (4) now
becomes
˙ k(t)=f(k(t),l(t)) + S(t) − δk(t) − (1 + τ(t))c(t), (15)
6Other taxes to capital or labour can be shown to have exactly the same role.
12The household now maximizes the utility (7) with respect to c(t),l (t) and subject to
capital stock accumulation (15) taking z(t), n(t) and S(t) as given. After redistribution
S(t)=τ(t)c(t), so in an equilibrium of identical households, (15) is no diﬀerent from (4),
but household consumption is changed.




= Uc − ψ(1 + τ)=0 , (16a)
∂H
∂l
= Ul + ψfl =0 , (16b)
˙ ψ = −ψfk +( θ + δ)ψ. (16c)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are interpreted in a similar in Section 2. The key diﬀerence
is that in (16a) a fraction of marginal utility is shaved-oﬀ as a result of the taxes on
consumption.
Let ¯ τ be the steady-state value of the consumption tax. Then the steady-state level







































The introduction of taxes has the aﬀect of directly reducing the steady-state levels
of work eﬀort in (17) and indirectly, the level of consumption and capital stock in (19).
Hence output falls as well. In order to ﬁnd the optimal level of taxation, we divide (13a)
by (9a). The optimal level of taxes is then given by
¯ τ =
" ργ







It follows that in the steady state consumption should be taxed or subsidized according
to whether the total consumption habit eﬀect,
ργ
ρ+θ is greater or less than the total work
ethic eﬀect αε
α+θ. All this, of course, is in accordance with proposition 2.
13The decentralized economy can be brought into line with the social optimum at each
point in time by a tax rate that equates the marginal rate of substitutions (MRS) between
consumption and work in the two economies. From the ﬁrst order conditions (16a) and











It follows that the optimal tax rate that achieves MRSDE = MRSSO is given by
τ = MRSSOfDE
l − 1. (22)
Consider Table 2 below we look at variations in the parameters of Eq. (20) and their
corresponding aﬀect on the optimal tax.
Table 2: Optimal taxes in a variety of cases.
Cases Taxes (¯ τ)
(a) Symmetric Habits (γ =0 .4,   =0 .4, α = ρ = 2,θ=0 .03)0
(b) Only Consumption Habit (γ =0 .4,   =0 , α = ρ = 2,θ=0 .03)0 . 6 5
(c) Con. Habits>Work Habit (γ =0 .6,   =0 .4, α = ρ = 2,θ=0 .03)0 . 4 8
(d) Only Work Habit (γ =0 ,   =0 .4, α = ρ =2 ,θ=0 .03) -0.39
(e) Con. Habit<Work Habit (γ =0 .4,   =0 .6, α = ρ = 2,θ=0 .03) -0.32
In case (a) in Table 2 habits are symmetric and there is no need to for taxes. This
is because the negative externality, due to the consumption habit, is cancelled out by the
positive externality of work ethic. In case (b) when there are no work habits; a case usually
considered in literature. For example, Ljungqvist and Ulhig (2000) show that without
work habits and external consumption habit, the taxes should equal 0.60; using parameters
values in Table 2. However, with the introduction of work habits and assuming that
consumption habits dominate, their optimal tax falls to 0.337. In this simple comparison
taxes are 45% lower which is non-trivial. Therefore, the relative importance of the two
habits matters a great deal for taxation at the steady-state; a result diﬀerent from Alsonso-
Carrera et al. (2005) In case (c) where consumption habits are 33% higher our economy,
taxes are 17% lower than in a model where work habits are ignored. In case (d) where
households only develop work-habits the social planner subsidizes consumption instead.
This is done so as to bring the marginal rate of substitution in line with that of the SO
economy as we discuss later.
7When we introduce work habits in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) model and assume instantaneous
absorption of habits, as they do, the optimal tax becomes: τ =1−
1−γ
1−ε
145 The Dynamic Analysis
In this section we study the convergence of our model economies towards the steady state.
Convergence occurs if only and if the model is stable . We conﬁne ourselves to the
examination of local stability in the vicinity of the steady state. First we linearize Uc, Ul,
Uz and Un about the steady state to give
Uc(z,c) ' Uc(¯ z,¯ c)+Ucz(¯ z,¯ c)(z − ¯ z)+Ucc(¯ z,¯ c)(c − ¯ c) (23)
Ul(n,l) ' Ul(¯ n,¯ l)+Uln(¯ n,¯ l)(n − ¯ n)+Ull(¯ n,¯ l)(l − ¯ l) (24)
Uz(z,c) ' Uz(¯ z,¯ c)+Uzz(¯ z,¯ c)(z − ¯ z)+Uzc(¯ z,¯ c)(c − ¯ c) (25)
Un(n,l) ' Un(¯ n,¯ l)+Unn(¯ n,¯ l)(n − ¯ n)+Unl(¯ n,¯ l)(l − ¯ l) (26)
It is convenient to express variables as proportional deviations ˆ x = x−¯ x
¯ x ' log x
¯ x.T h e n
Uc(z,c) ' Uc(¯ z,¯ c)+¯ zUcz(¯ z,¯ c)ˆ z +¯ cUcc(¯ z,¯ c)ˆ c (27)
Ul(n,l) ' Ul(¯ n,¯ l)+¯ nUln(¯ n,¯ l)ˆ n + ¯ lUll(¯ n,¯ l)ˆ l (28)
Uz(z,c) ' Uz(¯ z,¯ c)+¯ zUzz(¯ z,¯ c)ˆ z +¯ cUzc(¯ z,¯ c)ˆ c (29)
Un(n,l) ' Un(¯ n,¯ l)+¯ nUnn(¯ n,¯ l)ˆ n + ¯ lUnl(¯ n,¯ l)ˆ l (30)
We now consider the social optimum and the decentralized economy in turn:
5.1 The Social Optimum (SO)
Using (27)-(30), the linearized system for the SO becomes
˙ ˆ z = ρ(ˆ c − ˆ z) (31)
˙ ˆ n = α(ˆ l − ˆ n) (32)







¯ zUczˆ z +¯ cUccˆ c + ρ¯ λˆ λ − ¯ ψˆ ψ =0 (34)
¯ nUlnˆ n + ¯ lUllˆ l + α¯ βˆ β + fl¯ ψˆ ψ + ¯ ψ(¯ lfllˆ l + ¯ kflkˆ k)=0 (35)






Uzcˆ c +( ρ + θ)ˆ λ (36)






Unlˆ l +( α + θ)ˆ β (37)
˙ ˆ ψ = −(¯ lfklˆ l + ¯ kfkkˆ k) (38)
where all partial derivatives are evaluated at the steady state.


























where z(t)=[ ˆ z(t), ˆ n(t), ˆ k(t)] is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and x(t)=
[ˆ λ(t), ˆ β(t), ˆ ψ(t)] are non-predetermined variables. The condition for saddle-path stability
is that the matrix A+BC should have 3 eigenvalues; One with real part greater than zero
and two with less than zero8.
Matrices A, B and C are given by
A =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
−ρ 00 0 0 0
0 −α 00 0 0
00 θ 00 0
−(ρ + θ)(1 + γ(1 − σ)) 0 0 ρ + θ 00
0
(α+θ)
(1+ε(1+φ))−1 00 α + θ 0
00 ( 1 − a)(θ + δ)0 00
⎤













−(ρ + θ)(1 − σ)0
0 −(α + θ)(1 + φ)
0 −(1 − a)(θ + δ)
⎤





















where x =[ ( α + θ) − αε]a + φ(α + θ).
Simulation using baseline values of parameters and a range of alternatives around the
baseline showed the saddle-path stability condition is satisﬁed and robust. Looking at
our matrices A, B and C it is clear that there are two driving forces in our transitional
dynamics. The ﬁrst are the parameters of the speed of adjustments to habits and the
weight assigned to habit benchmarks in both consumption and labour supply. The second
8See Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for the discrete-time case and Levine and Currie (1987) for the
continuous-time case appropriate for this paper.
16is the diminishing returns in our production function. Say, for sake of argument, we rid
ourselves of diminishing returns and ignore work-habits so that a =1and ε,α =0 . In
this case the dynamics are entirely driven by the speed of adjustments and the weight
assigned to consumption benchmarks and as a result an important piece of action goes
missing. Carroll et al., Alonso-Carrera et al. and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. incorporate
only consumption dynamics. However, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. and Alonso-Carrera et al.
(2004) highlight the important role diminishing returns play during transitional dynamics
with internal consumption habits formation.
5.2 The Decentralized Economy (DE)
Consider the decentralized economy without taxes. The linearized system for the DE
follows by putting ˆ λ(t)=ˆ β(t)=0in (31)-(38) to get
˙ ˆ z = ρ(ˆ c − ˆ z) (41)
˙ ˆ n = α(ˆ l − ˆ n) (42)







¯ zUczˆ z +¯ cUccˆ c − ¯ ψˆ ψ =0 (44)
¯ nUlnˆ n + ¯ lUllˆ l + fl¯ ψˆ ψ + ¯ ψ(¯ lfllˆ l + ¯ kflkˆ k)=0 (45)
˙ ˆ ψ = −(¯ lfklˆ l + ¯ kfkkˆ k) (46)
where all partial derivatives are evaluated at the steady state of the decentralized economy.
The state-space form of DE is (39) and (40) where z(t)=[ ˆ z(t), ˆ n(t), ˆ k(t)] is a vector of
predetermined variables at time t as for the SO, but now x(t)=[ˆ ψ(t)] consists of only one
non-predetermined variable. The condition for saddle-path stability is that there should
be 3 eigenvalues real part less than zero and 1 with real part greater than zero.
Matrices A, B and C for with the parameter values for which the steady-state is same
to that of the social optimum are
A =
⎡





00 ( 1 − a)(θ + δ)0
⎤













0 −(1 − a)(θ + δ)
⎤
















As for the SO, simulation using baseline values of parameters and a range of alternatives
around the baseline showed the saddle-path stability condition is satisﬁed and robust. So
far we have considered the DE without taxes. With taxes
¯ zUczˆ z +¯ cUccˆ c − (¯ ψ +¯ τ)ˆ ψ − ¯ ψˆ τ =0 (47)
where ˆ τ = τ − ¯ τ.T h e n w i t h ¯ τ given by (20) the DE can be put on the path of the SO if
ˆ τ is chosen such that
ˆ τ = −(1 − σ)γˆ zDE − ψDE − σˆ cSO (48)
5.3 Simulations
5.3.1 Simulations where the SO and DE Steady States Coincide
We now turn to simulations of the SO and the DE economies. We assume that at time
t =1the capital stock is 10% below its long-run steady steady in both cases so that
ˆ k(0) = −10. The parameter values are baseline values from Table 1: ρ = α =0 .2,
γ =   =0 .5, σ = φ =2 .0, θ =0 .02, δ =0 .05 and A = χ =1 . For these symmetrical
parameter values the steady-states of the SO and the DE are the same. In fact its the
the point where the two curves meet in Figure 1. The simulations we present isolate the
eﬀects of habit in consumption and labour supply on the transitional dynamics.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 Here
Figures 2 and 3 compare consumption and consumption habit in the SO and the DE.
In both cases consumption immediately falls by 3% − 4% (relative to the steady state
for all variables), and savings rise but the ﬁrst-period adjustment is greater for the DE.
Because this drop is too high relative to the SO a consumption subsidy starting at 1.5% is
required to bring the DE in line with the SO. The reason is that in the DE the household
ignores that eﬀect of a fall in current consumption on the evolution of the habit, whereas,
the SO internalizes this eﬀect. Consequently, prevented by the habit, the initial drop in
consumption is less pronounced for the SO than for the DE; Alvarez et al. (2004) ﬁnd a
similar result. Corresponding to the immediate fall in consumption levels we see a gradual
drop in the stock of consumption habit reaching 2% − 2.5% after almost 10 years, this
b e i n gm o r ep r o n o u n c e df o rt h eD E . T h et r o u g ho c c u rw i t hs o m el a ga sh a b i te v o l u t i o n
is not instantaneous.
18Insert Figures 4 and 5 Here
Figures 4 and 5 compare labour supply and labour supply habit in the SO and the
DE. In both cases labour supply immediately rises by 1.7% for the DE and 2.2% for the
SO. The planner supplies more labour in the SO as he can see the future beneﬁt arising
from of the externality of working harder. This increases output and provides a further
resource available for investment. Corresponding to this immediate rise in labour supply
see a gradual rise in the stock of labour supply habit peaking at round after 12 years for
both the SO and the DE. In later years labour supply returns to its steady state and is
consistently higher in the SO compared with the DE. The subsidy for consumption then
e n c o u r a g e st h es u b s t i t u t i o no fl e i s u r ef o rc o n s u m p t i o na n dw o r ke ﬀort increases.
As a result of more saving by the household and more eﬀort resources are channeled
into investment and capital stock returns to its steady state. Although more labour is
employed in the SO which tends to increase output, savings out of a given level of output
is lower (recall that consumption drop in SO was less pronounced). The net eﬀect is
that investment is lower in the SO and hence the capital stock, as Figure 6 shows. Our
result show that capital destruction is followed be a period of high savings and increased
economic growth is consistent with the empirical observation. We also ﬁnd that this shock
leads to a drop in habits. However, Carroll et. al (1997) ﬁnd diﬀerent results. This
is because they examine models without variable labour supply and an AK production
function so that growth does not gradually rise following a destruction in capital as in our
case.
Insert Figures 6 Here
Finally, we compare the consumer’s welfare under the SO and the DE. Let cSO(t)=
cSO(1 + ˆ cSO) be the actual transition path for consumption under the SO, where cSO is
the steady state. The same procedure is carried out the rest of the variables and also the














Then we can write down the percentage welfare gain from having a social planner (in other





Another way of measuring these welfare gains is in terms of the equivalent permanent %
increase in consumption. Expanding the single-period utility function as a Taylor series
19and integrating the discounted utility over time, a 1% permanent increase in consumption
increases the steady state inter-temporal utility at the SO by (1 − γ)(cSO)(1−γ)(1−σ)/θ ×
0.01. An intertemporal welfare diﬀerence of Ω(∞)SO−Ω(∞)DE is therefore equivalent to
a permanent consumption equivalent % increase, ce,g i v e nb y
ce =
Ω(∞)SO − Ω(∞)DE
(1 − γ)(cSO)(1−γ)(1−σ)/θ × 0.01
(51)
This function of T is plotted in Figure 7. The higher proportional divergence between
the SO and the DE in the earlier years means that the welfare gain starts at a high level
but thereafter falls.
Insert Figure 7 Here
As t →∞the welfare gain tends to around G(∞)=0 .5% for which using (51),
ce =0 .08%. This, it should be stressed, is for parameter values for which the steady-states
o ft h eS Oa n dt h eD Ea r et h es a m es ot h er e s u l tt h a te m e r g e si st h a tthe ineﬃciency of
the DE in terms only of transitional dynamics seems to be small. This result is in stark
contrast contrast with Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005) who stress on the importance of
dynamics ineﬃciency; hence taxation during transition. However, this result is in line
with Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) who also ﬁnd the dynamic ﬁne-tuning less important
when the social planner sets the optimal tax rate to its steady-state value. The intuition
behind this result is that the ineﬃcient consumption-leisure choice in the DE quickly fades
away as the economy returns to its eﬃcient steady state since the agent can choose the
optimal labour supply. If the steady state of the DE is ineﬃcient however the welfare
implications are quite diﬀerent, as we now see.
5.3.2 Simulations where the SO and DE Steady States Diﬀer
We now consider the case where the steady states of the SO and the DE diﬀer. We retain
previous parameter values except now   =0so there is only consumption habit, but no
labour supply habit, as in much of the literature. Now according to proposition 2 the
steady state consumption and labour supply in the DE is above that of the SO.
Insert Figures 8-13 Here
We now carry out a similar exercise to above. Capital stocks is initially 10% below
the steady state of the SO. Figures 8 to 13 show the results for this case. All values
are measured relative to the steady state of the SO, so for the latter the relevant variable
20converges to zero, but for the DE it converges to the diﬀerence between the steady states
of the DE and the SO.
There are now welfare gains from the SO in the steady state9 and during the transition
path. The overall inter-temporal welfare gain in the SO G(∞)=0 .68%, which corre-
sponds to ce =1 .33%, a considerable increase on the previous case where only transitional
dynamics were involved. Table 3 compares the ineﬃciencies of the DE in these two cases.
Table 3. The Ineﬃciency of the DE
Parameters G(∞) ce
  = γ =0 .5 0.05 0.08
  =0 , γ =0 .5 0.68 1.33
The behavior of taxes under this situation is in contrast to the results in the literature.
Consider Figure 8 where we can see the inter-temporal path of taxes which does not
converge to zero over time. In fact the intervention starts oﬀ with a subsidy (τ<0 before
developing into a permanent consumption tax (τ>0) in order to correct the persistent
high consumption in the DE relative to the SO. The reason for the initial subsidy is that
faced with only a permanent consumption tax, agents would overreact to the shock by
under consuming relative to the social planner. Our economy without this tax or subsidy
is not only less ineﬃcient during the transition path, it is permanently ineﬃc i e n ta tt h e
steady state. Therefore, there is a sustained need for the government. Recent literature,
for example Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2005) call for relaxing constraints in the Euro-
zone labour market, via lower labour taxes, in the European in order to encourage working
hours. Our paper, on the contrary, suggest that policies trying improve work-hours may
not be desirable if habit in consumption exceeds that in labour supply, which is the case
in typical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.10
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we analyze a dynamic equilibrium model where the households choose both
consumption and labour supply and adopt multiple habits of the ring to which they belong.
9This is not always the case with discounting because then the steady state of the inter-temporal
optimum is not the same as the optimum of the steady state. For parameter values that bring the steady
state of the SO and the DE closer we ﬁnd that with a discounting parameter θ =0 .03, the steady state of
the SO does actually yield a higher welfare than that for the DE.
10Indeed this is true for the model of Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2005) which is based on Smets and
Wouters (2003), since these models only have habit in consumption.
21Our main ﬁndings are: First, consumption and work habit have the same eﬀect on labour
supply, consumption and output. Keeping up with the Jones means that people consume
more at the expense of leisure. The work ethic eﬀect of habit in labour supply mean
that households work more, adding to the consumption habit eﬀect. Both forms of habit,
drive us towards the 24/7 society. Second, the two externalities involved in external habit
work in opposite directions. For consumption external habit is a negative externality
as it reduces the utility of others in the economy. By contrast external habit in labour
supply reduces the disutility and therefore is a positive externality. Hence the ineﬃciencies
move in opposite directions and tend to cancel out. Multiple habits can therefore involve
both a consumption tax and subsidy to correct for these externalities. Third, with
plausible parameter values the welfare consequences of multiple habits are far greater
where there are long-run ineﬃciencies compared with only transitional ineﬃciency, as in
much of the literature that ignores changes in labour supply. Finally there are important
policy implications for the proposed liberalization of the European labour market. Our
paper suggests that the lower working hours observed in Europe compared with the US
may not be welfare-reducing if habit in consumption exceeds that in labour supply.
The most pressing issue for future research is the empirical relevance of the multiple
habit model and indeed whether habit is external or internal. A systematic empirical
assessment of the various forms of habit in the literature is clearly required.11.O n e w a y
of proceeding is by a direct estimation of the two Euler equations in the present model.
Another approach is to incorporate the competing models of habit into a DSGE model
such as Smets and Wouters (2003) and use Bayesian methods to determine the preferred
formulation. Both these avenues are the subject of current research by the authors.
11This could be extended to include ‘deep habits’ as in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
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Figure 2: Transitional Path for Consumption ˆ c(t)






























Figure 3: Transitional Path for Consumption Habit ˆ z(t)

























Figure 4: Transitional Path for Labour Supply ˆ l(t)





























Figure 5: Transitional Path for Labour Habit ˆ n(t)


























Figure 6: Figure 6:Path for Capital Stock ˆ k(t)
























Figure 7: Welfare Gains from Social Planning G(T).







































Figure 8: Transitional Path for Consumption ˆ c(t)































Figure 9: Transitional Path for Consumption Habit ˆ z(t)



























Figure 10: Transitional Path for Labour Supply ˆ l(t)

























Figure 11: Transitional Path for Labour Habit ˆ n(t)




























Figure 12: Transitional Path for Capital Stock ˆ k(t)

























Figure 13: Welfare Gains from Social Planning G(T)
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